The Allegations: ‘Sheer Recklessness’

Hideki Makihara said that he was involved with the bullet train project but was unimpressed by Indian negotiations. “The Shinkansen project in India is something I was involved with myself, but what stood out in international meetings and negotiations was the sheer recklessness of the Indian side, repeated over and over,” Makihara wrote. “They just don’t keep promises, no matter what. Even if they make a promise, they flip it right away. They keep pushing their own self-interest right up to the very end,” he said.

He further targeted Indian leadership, adding, “The minister in charge was especially awful—if the top guy’s like that, there’s no way to have any decent dealings. For the honor of all the Japanese folks who poured their hearts into this, I have to say it: I feel 100% that the reason this hasn’t moved forward is entirely on the Indian side.”

Makihara also pointed to the exclusion of Japanese technology from the signalling system—the critical safety backbone of any rail network—as evidence of the project’s failure.

Beyond the Rhetoric: The Signalling Dispute

While Makihara’s comments highlight deep diplomatic friction, the core of the disagreement lies in a fundamental clash over technology. The tension stems from India’s decision to move away from the proprietary Japanese DS-ATC (Digital Communication-Assisted Automatic Train Control) signalling standard in favour of the European Train Control System (ETCS) Level 2.

According to reports, the Japanese system is effectively a ‘closed black box’. Its adoption would have tethered India exclusively to Japanese conglomerates, such as Hitachi and Kawasaki, for the entire lifecycle of the network. Under such an arrangement, India would have been trapped in a ‘maintenance monopoly’, unable to perform independent repairs or seek third-party support for software patches and hardware upgrades, leaving the nation subject to proprietary pricing.

Strategic independence vs. diplomatic friction

By opting for the Siemens-led ETCS Level 2 consortium, India has shifted toward a global open-standard architecture. This system is currently utilised by over 50 countries, offering a level of interoperability that the Japanese standard lacks. In fact, the semi-high-speed Namo Bharat corridor between Delhi and Meerut is also being run on the ETCS Level 2 and has been impressive. India’s decision to deploy ETCS Level 2 on the bullet train corridor effectively ends potential vendor lock-in. This means, in the future, India will have the flexibility to contract with other global players like Alstom or Ansaldo, or even utilise domestic engineering expertise to maintain and upgrade the network.

Perhaps most significantly, the choice of ETCS breaks the physical requirement for Japanese-only rolling stock. Previously, the Japanese signalling architecture would have restricted India to using specific Shinkansen trainsets, such as the E5 or E10 series. With the move to an open signalling network, India has positioned itself to float global tenders or deploy its own upcoming high-speed variants in future. 

While New Delhi’s pivot has clearly caused significant frustration in Tokyo, the strategic reality is that India has prioritised long-term operational independence and cost control. The ‘failure’ described by the former minister is, from New Delhi’s perspective, a calculated shift to ensure that India’s high-speed rail infrastructure remains an open, scalable, and sovereign asset rather than a lifetime dependency on a single foreign partner.