During a meeting with Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Asim Munir, on July 25, the Vice-Chairman of China’s Central Military Commission, Zhang Youxia, urged Pakistan to ensure the safety of Chinese nationals, projects, and institutions operating in the country. China’s repeated calls for stronger security reflect lingering apprehensions that continue to cast a shadow over the “all-weather strategic cooperative partnership”. This engagement, Munir’s first with the Chinese military leadership since his visit to the White House, informs a pressured bilateral dynamic shaped by security deficits that threaten the operational viability of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
The increased security threats against Chinese personnel and infrastructure in Pakistan sheds light on the fault line that Beijing can no longer mitigate solely through incremental security enhancements and diplomatic assurances. A report by Pakistan’s National Counter Terrorism Authority (Nacta) in 2024 noted that 20 Chinese nationals have been killed and 34 wounded in militant plots since 2021.
A Twin Problem
These security violations, perpetrated by both Baloch insurgents and Islamist outfits like the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), speak to Pakistan’s chronic governance and law enforcement challenges in safeguarding critical assets. As such, the consistency of these security threats can plausibly evolve from mere irritants to serious obstacles to Chinese presence in Pakistan. Consequently, this undermines China’s capacity to provide foreign direct investment critical to its economic aspirations in Pakistan.
Chinese assets in Pakistan essentially face threats from two groups: TTP and Baloch insurgents, each motivated by independent but overlapping reasons. The TTP’s targeting of Chinese interests is part of its broader ideological opposition to the Pakistani state and its strategic partnerships, aimed at undermining Islamabad by attacking high-profile symbols. Meanwhile, Baloch insurgent groups perceive Chinese investment as exploitation of their region’s resources, which marginalises the community and dilutes their autonomy. While collaboration between the two groups is purportedly restricted to low-level logistical support, this twin threat reflects a converging modus operandi in targeting China as a proxy to challenge Pakistan’s economic agenda.
The War Within Pakistan
The tensions highlight the coexistence of two competing narratives within Pakistan. On one hand, both countries are determined to deepen this strategic bilateral relationship, supported by geopolitical imperatives and economic benefits. Concurrent to that is the Pakistani state institutions’ limitations in enforcing security frameworks in sensitive regions, addressing ethnic grievances and perceptions of economic marginalisation. This reality raises dissonance between Pakistan’s internal security policies and its alignment with national strategic goals.
The modus operandi of Baloch groups in recent years has included hijacking passenger trains and convoys, targeting road transport vehicles, seizing strategic towns like Mangochar to block key highways such as the Quetta-Karachi route (N-25), and employing suicide bombers, including women, to maximise impact. These road-based attacks seek to paralyse crucial trade routes, triggering supply chain disruptions and increased security costs.
A Fragile Friendship
The second phase of the CPEC, which will shift focus to business-to-business (B2B) cooperation, essentially depends on legitimacy derived from security confidence. The repeated targeting of Chinese assets exposes the fragility of this foundation.
While Pakistan has employed various measures, such as deploying Special Security Divisions, instituting Safe City surveillance systems, and reinforcing airport and transit security protocols, these measures appear reactive rather than preemptive. They enable tactical mitigation without addressing strategic vulnerabilities within Pakistan’s counter-terrorism abilities and complex socio-political environment. Further, Pakistan’s staunch refusal or limited allowance for Chinese involvement in on-ground security operations points to a sovereignty dilemma.
In that light, Zhang’s statement should be seen as Beijing’s genuinely waning patience with Pakistan’s perceived security inadequacies, and not just as diplomatic rhetoric. This puts Islamabad under immense pressure to resolve internal security-related weaknesses.
Will China ‘Reassess’ Its Friendship?
From a regional geostrategic position, Pakistan’s security shortcomings can have broader ramifications. The CPEC, the flagship of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), integrates economically and strategically with western China’s stability agenda, notably over Xinjiang. Pakistan’s inability to guarantee security undermines these strategic objectives, which may force China to reassess risk thresholds. This precarious nature highlights the extent to which bilateral ties are vulnerable, beyond diplomatic management, to internal security dynamics.
From an economic perspective, these challenges translate to tangible costs. Project delays, increased insurance premiums, operational scale-backs, and threats to Chinese nationals directly erode the cost-benefit calculus underpinning Chinese investment decisions in Pakistan. Pakistan’s broader economic challenges further aggravate this situation, with fiscal constraints impacting the sustained funding required for comprehensive security improvements and institutional reforms. Consequently, the flawed security environment can quickly turn Pakistan from a strategic partner to a liability in Chinese geopolitical decisions.
Failing to substantially reduce threats to Chinese interests can risk catalysing strategic recalibration in Beijing, potentially impacting trust, restricting future investments, and leading to more stringent terms of engagements. For India, the ongoing security volatility in Balochistan carries broader implications. It may encourage China to echo Pakistan’s narrative that external actors, particularly New Delhi, are covertly backing Baloch militants to sabotage CPEC. As with Kashmir, the discourse around Balochistan risks shifting from a domestic insurgency to a contested geopolitical flashpoint.
