In a span of roughly eight weeks, the Taliban has undone a two-decade nation-building effort bankrolled by the United States. The insurgents’ capture of the presidential palace in Kabul on Sunday – Afghan President Ghani had already fled the country – is, however, just a prelude to the re-establishment of an Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the wheels of which are now in motion.
Although Taliban co-founder, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar has proclaimed that the newly-installed Taliban government will go “as far as possible for the betterment of the people’s lives,” the scenes unfolding at Kabul airport, and a string of reports reflecting the fear of the Afghan public suggest that hopes of many that remain trapped in the country are quickly withering away.
But the ripple effect of the Taliban returning to power isn’t confined to the nation’s borders. The fundamentalists’ ascendancy has significant geopolitical implications – ones that New Delhi will be alert to.
Last week, India closed its Kandahar consulate, drawing down its diplomatic presence in the country, while focusing efforts on evacuating embassy staff and Indian citizens. The Kandahar embassy closure was the third to shut since 2020.
India’s ties with the Ghani-led Afghan government had also yielded an investment of $3 billion in infrastructural projects into the country, more specifically in the form of the Zaranj-Delaram Highway and Salma Dam, both of which are now in Taliban-controlled territory.
There is then, a legitimate fear that the goodwill India had garnered with the previous dispensation will be eroded, with the future of these projects also now hanging in the balance.
India, reportedly, has no official channel of communication with the Taliban, which will worry New Delhi, particularly given the influence Pakistan may have in charting Afghanistan’s future.
New Delhi’s concerns will also stem from the continued presence of outfits like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad in Afghanistan that the Taliban, to date, has tolerated. However, it bears mentioning that India does not have direct borders with Afghanistan with Pakistan, in effect, acting as a geopolitical barrier.
Fears of an increased terrorist threat at India’s borders still persist though and much will depend on Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts. An ailing Pakistani economy, political observers have noted, may make Islamabad disinclined to permit the militia expansion.
Some analysts have also noted that the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan may embolden dissident outfits in Pakistan to stage their own attacks against the incumbent Imran Khan-led government. Nevertheless, the threat of increased radicalisation in India’s neighbourhood has escalated.
With the Taliban seizing control, what is also likely to follow is a severe dilution in women’s and minority rights borne out of a harsh and rigid system of governance. A refugee crisis is imminent and New Delhi will have to quickly decide whether its stance toward those fleeing Afghanistan will be accommodative or otherwise.
The coming weeks and months will reveal more about the shape of the Taliban regime. As such, New Delhi, as some experts have suggested, may, at this juncture, be wise to adopt a ‘wait and watch’ approach.
