The Chinese discourse on the 4 February Xi-Putin summit, held amidst the ongoing US-Russia standoff over Ukraine, has been marked with contradictions. On the one hand, there has been much hype over China and Russia finally being brought together under combined pressure from the US and Europe. On the other hand, there ran a counter narrative that the US and Europe are provoking trouble, sowing suspicion, casting shadows, and trying to widen the rift between Moscow and Beijing.
Sections within the Chinese commentariat were seemingly exhilarated at the formation of “a new global pole”, with “China-Russia de-facto quasi-alliance”, which they said, will give “sleepless nights” to policymakers in many Western capitals. However, at the same time, there were comparatively sober takes, which assessed the meeting particularly from the perspective of a rising geopolitical trend, where the US and the entire Western Bloc are understood to be seeking to interfere in or sabotage China-Russia relations and sow discord between the two. Not just commentaries and analysis, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng, while briefing the Chinese media, not only talked about the “No Limit…No Forbidden Zone…No Ceiling” nature of China-Russia friendship, but also about China’s concerns over attempts being made to divide the two.
It is rather interesting that even as one of the biggest security crises between US and Russia is unfolding in Europe, the buzz in Beijing is about the long-term trend of the US seeking to drive a wedge between China and Russia. In recent years, a recurrent theme in Chinese research has been how the earlier discourse of “China-Russia axis of convenience, with little impact on American interest” is giving way to a higher degree of vigilance within the American strategic community against the development of China-Russia cooperative relations and their heightened interest in jeopardising the momentum of cooperation between the two, either by exploiting the loopholes in their bilateral ties or encouraging competition between them. It is further noted with concern that on the premise that China is understood as the greatest long-term threat to the US, the voices for adjusting policies towards Russia, uniting with Russia to control China are getting louder and louder not just in the US but the entire Western bloc. In this regard, the “need Russia to fight China” view expressed by the likes of German Navy Chief Vice Admiral Kay-Achim Schönbach or U.S. Senator Josh Hawley is not lost on China. In the Chinese assessment, the strategic goal of the United States since the Trump administration, has been to win over Russia, to isolate China; if not winning over, at least keeping Russia neutral in the China-US contest. The “diplomatically more experienced” Biden administration is also understood to have so far prioritised US-Russia dialogue for a more “stable and predictable relationship” with Russia.
On the other hand, Chinese strategists’ reading of Russia’s China policy is also quite intriguing. While discussing “the new trends in Russia’s China strategy amid growing Sino-US rivalry and fundamentally reversed Sino-Russian power balance”, Lei Jianfeng, professor at China’s Foreign Affairs University notes the strategic trend in Russia to simultaneously coordinate two triangular relationships (China-United States-Russia and China-Russia-India) to seek greater autonomy in decision-making and expanding its existing diplomatic space
Chinese observers lament how even in the new situation, Russia still believes it is in a peer game rather than a non-peer asymmetrical game with the United States and thus doesn’t want to play an auxiliary role (of a smaller energy partner for China) in China-US bipolar competition but seeks to be an independent pole in the triangle. Therefore, while seeking to use its relations with China as a strategic counterweight and a geopolitical lever against the United States, it simultaneously tries to open up new channels for dialogue and strives for better relations with the US. On the other hand, to make up for its strength gap with China and the potential risks (such as uncertainties in China’s own security and development, the possibility of changes in China’s Russia policy once it gets even stronger in the future, Russia’s overdependence on China, economically or otherwise etc.) in China-Russia relations, Russia seeks to vigorously develop its relations with India, and use it as an important bargaining chip against Chinese influence. Russia-India relations not only help Russia to maintain its (Russia’s) initiative in China-Russia relations, but also at the same time provide an opportunity/platform for Russia to reach out to the US, given the increasing strategic partnership between the United States and India. In return Russia, it is observed, helps in enhancing India’s international status to a certain extent and strengthening its bargaining/negotiating power vis-a-vis China.
It is in the backdrop of these complex dynamics of China-Russia-US relations, the current impasse in Ukraine is broadly seen in China as a new mode of interaction between the US and Russia –seeking dialogue with each other, while keeping their hands on the trigger. Russia, it is argued, has seized the opportunity of the overall pattern of comparative decline in the US power, the diplomatic chaos in the Western camp, the stalemate at the global game between major powers and the increasing desire among sections within the western camp to warm up to Russia to face the China challenge, to put forward its various security demands to the West. On the other hand, controlled confrontation with Russia also suits US interests to a certain extent as the more tense the situation in Europe, there will be greater legitimacy of NATO’s existence, more tightly will Europe be tied to the United States, ensuring better cohesion and coordination within the US alliance system.
As US-Russia jostle over Ukraine, China’s biggest concern seems to be how to ensure that if faced with an opportunity to develop cooperative ties with the United States at a lower cost, Russia does not choose to trade off Chinese interests and settle for a compromise with the United States at China’s cost. Chinese strategists acknowledge that at present the benefits of China-Russia cooperation to each other do not surpass the benefits of cooperation between either side and the United States, which can radically transform respective country’s international status, improve their unfavourable security environment, in addition to providing unparalleled opportunities in terms of capital and technology. As a result, it is believed that cooperation with the US still holds a certain charm for either side and there still remains much room for deception and betrayal within China-Russia relations. With intensifying competition in US-China relations becoming a long-term trend, China expects the degree of Russia-US confrontation to eventually be reduced or eased out to a certain extent in the future. Now, the question doing round among Chinese strategic circles is that in such a situation, how to reduce the risk of being back-stabbed or falling into an inconvenient two-front challenge? How to guarantee strategic backing or support from Russia in time of need, either through binding the interests of the two countries together (preferably by establishing a strong natural gas supply-demand relation), or ensuring a reasonable distribution of cooperation benefits, or by increasing the cost for the potential defector.
Overall, one can conclude that currently a very complicated and multi-layered game is underway between China, US and Russia in Europe. Which way it will develop from here remains to be seen.
