In early January 2021, the Chinese State Councillor Wang Yi visited Nay Pyi Taw. During the visit he was given a detailed diatribe by the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces) on the reported election fraud responsible for National League of Democracy’s (NLD) landslide victory in the November 2020 elections. Consequently, on the morning of 1st February 2021, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing declared a state of emergency which led to the arrest of the President U Win Min and the State Councillor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. By the end of the day, the Tatmadaw had taken over the reins of the country.
Whilst there has been no credible correlation between these two events, the fact that China termed the military coup as a “cabinet reshuffle” did not go down well with international observers and the local populace. Additionally, the fact that PRC has also clearly signalled their opinions for the situation in Myanmar by abstaining from discussing the issue at the United Nations Security Council, several International Relations experts are convinced that Wang Yi’s January visit, in all possibility, was a tacit support on the part of PRC.
Scenes from Myanmar after the Military Coup on February 1st, 2021
Shortly after the 1st February 2021 coup, the Civil Disobedience Movement resisting the Military takeover became convinced that China knew about Min Aung Hlaing’s plans of staging a Military coup and offered a silent approval. This fuelled anti-Chinese sentiments which spread quickly throughout the country and large demonstrations were mounted against the Chinese Embassy in Yangon and their office at Nay Pyi Taw. Several other Chinese facilities were also targeted including a small scale blast at the China-Myanmar Oil and Gas pipeline. Before long, anti-Chinese sentiments turned violent with arson attacks on Chinese factories. These attacks led to several Chinese factories being burned down and resulted in several Chinese businesses shutting down. Whilst China’s refusal to condemn the Military coup provided the spark to these incidents, there is more than meets the eye. The rise in anti-China sentiments have also raised questions in the local population about the long standing suspicion over the billions of dollars earmarked for Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative which has manifested itself in the form of the China Myanmar Economic Corridor or the CMEC.
China-Myanmar relations, which has been termed as “Pauk Phaw” or fraternal, has always been shadowed by mutual suspicion and distrust. There is a deep sense of anti-China sentiment prevalent in Myanmar dating back to the anti-Chinese riots of 1967 and the sweeping Chinese support to the Communist Party of Burma insurgency which ravaged the Northern Shan State in 1973. However in 1988, following the infamous 8888 Uprising, Myanmar was termed as a Pariah by the West and China swiftly moved in to fill in the voids. During the 90s and early 2000, the Military junta which had no choice but to cosy up to China continued to scrutinise China as a “shaky partner” primarily owing to the connect that China had with the Ethnic Armed Organisations who were at constant war with the Tatmadaw. The distrust that the Tatmadaw harboured against China was clearly evident in the fact that the Myitsone dam project was scrapped by the Military backed Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP), the quasi-Government that was in power in 2011. The ripples that the Myitsone dam project caused were felt for several years and it is only in 2016 when the National League of Democracy came to power that China began vigorously engaging the ruling Government of Myanmar with its comprehensive “soft power”.
Artist’s conception, Myitsone Dam. The construction of this dam was suspended in 2017 but China has been vigorously lobbying to revive this project.
Between 2016 and 2020, friendship blossomed between Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the Chinese leaders and China began extracting a large price by bagging large infrastructure projects in exchange for its guarantee “veto” at the UNSC. During the NLD regime, China signed several MOUs for infrastructure projects the largest being the CMEC which was proposed by Wang Yi during his visit to Myanmar in November 2017. Also, President Xi Jinping visited Nay Pyi Taw on 17 January 2020 during which he published a letter in the Myanmar press, stressing on progress on the three pillars of CMEC namely the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone, the New Yangon City development and the China Myanmar Border Economic Cooperation Zone.
However, a question which arises frequently since the Military coup of 1st February 2021 is – “Does the CMEC have a future”.
What lies ahead for China, Myanmar & the CMEC?
Several IR strategists have claimed that with the ongoing sanctions imposed by USA and EU, Myanmar would yet again become a Pariah and would automatically be catapulted towards China thereby giving the CMEC a renewed drive.
However, this is not completely true.
The instability in Myanmar and the fact that CMEC passes through the most troubled areas in Myanmar where Ethnic Armed Organisations have intensified their armed conflict with the Tatmadaw; the friendly and bonhomie relation which China built over the years with the NLD coupled with the caution/ suspicion with which the Tatmadaw views China; and most importantly the rising sentiment that China has exploited Myanmar’s resources, vulnerabilities and national sentiments, are all factors that need to be considered to reach a logical conclusion.
Anti-coup protesters hold placards at the Chinese Embassy in Yangon on Monday. / Nan Lwin / The Irrawaddy
There is absolutely no doubt that Myanmar requires economic development. However, it is equally concerned about the rising influence of China, which gives rise to the debate over whether the CMEC projects would eventually serve Myanmar’s interests. There have been a few articles sponsored by China that have tried to portray CMEC as win-win situation for everyone. However, lack of transparency, non-participation of locals, anti-China sentiments, suspicion on part of the Tatmadaw and impact on the environment are critical factors that would definitely affect the progress of CMEC.
